It has long been my conviction that many of the problems encountered in artificial intelligence research are basically philosophical problems. In particular, in order to build an artificial rational agent, one must first have a clear theory of rationality to serve as a target for implementation. Accordingly, the OSCAR project is aimed at providing such a theory and building an AI system to implement it. In its present incarnation, OSCAR is a programmable architecture for a rational agent, based upon a general-purpose defeasible reasoner. To use this architecture to construct an actual agent, one must fill it out in various ways. This can be regarded as a matter of programming the architecture to implement proposed principles of rationality. For those who are skeptical about the very possibility of interesting AI systems, it is to be emphasized that this system is fully implemented, and available from the author for use by other researchers.
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I will begin by giving a very brief sketch of the general architecture, and then I will turn to some questions about practical reasoning that will constitute the main focus of this paper. These are questions that must be answered before OSCAR can become a full-fledged rational agent.
On the conception of rationality embodied in OSCAR (discussed further in my [1993] and [1995] ), a rational agent can be regarded as having four basic constituents:
• One or more mechanisms for proposing goals.
• A mechanism for evaluating the "goodness" of plans.
• A mechanism for searching for and adopting plans on the basis of their comparative evaluations by the plan evaluator.
• A mechanism for initiating action on the basis of adopted plans (together, possibly, with built-in or learned plan-schemas). These mechanisms constitute a system of practical cognition. On any theory of rationality, plan evaluation and adoption will be based in part on what beliefs the agent has about its situation. Accordingly, an important part of a rational agent is a system of epistemic cognition producing such beliefs. As will be seen below, in OSCAR, the bulk of the work involved in finding, evaluating, and choosing plans and directing action is done by epistemic cognition rather than by dedicated special-purpose modules devoted to practical cognition.
The OSCAR architecture begins with a situation-evaluator, which produces a (real-measurable) degree of liking for the agent's current situation. This is presumed to be sensitive to the agent's beliefs about its situation. The likeability of a situation is the degree the agent would like it if it had true beliefs about all relevant aspects of the situation. The objective of the agent's reasoning is to put itself in situations that are more likeable than the situations in which it would find itself if it did not take action.
Ideally, plans are evaluated in terms of the expected likeability of their being adopted. This is just the mathematical expectation of the likeability of the situation-type consisting of their being adopted. Reasoning about expected likeabilities involves both reasoning about likeabilities and reasoning about probabilities. Such reasoning is computationally difficult, so the OSCAR 1 architecture allows the use of shortcut procedures for producing approximate evaluations of plans. Such shortcut procedures are called Q&I modules ("quick and inflexible"). Q&I modules occur throughout rational cognition (in humans, as well as in OSCAR). A mark of rationality, however, is that when the output of Q&I modules conflicts with the output of explicit reasoning, the agent overrides the Q&I modules and adopts the conclusion of the reasoning. Goals are judged suitable or unsuitable on the basis of their expected likeability. The function of goals is to direct the course of planning. The use of goals and standard techniques of goal reduction constitutes a control mechanism for planning. Without goals, the agent would have to survey plans at random. The chances of finding good plans in that way are miniscule. With the help of goals, planning is constrained, and because suitable goals have high expected likeability, there is a (defeasible) presumption that plans having a high likelihood of achieving suitable goals will also have high expected likeabilities. This provides a defeasible basis for adopting plans without going through the onerous process of computing their expected likeabilities.
Shortcut procedures for the choice of goals are indispensible in any realistic agent, because the agent must be able to live in the world before it acquires the general knowledge that is required for evaluating the suitability of goals. These take the form of Q&I modules called optative dispositions, which are dispositions to adopt goals. Some optative dispositions may be built into a rational agent from the beginning, and others can be acquired by conditioning mechanisms. In human beings, such dispositions produce desires. Desiring something constitutes a defeasible ground for choosing it as a goal, but in an ideally rational agent, the belief that the object of desire does not have satisfactorily high expected likeability should override the desire.
The system of epistemic cognition embodied in OSCAR is based upon an "interest-driven" defeasible reasoner. This means, in part, that epistemic cognition is driven by practical cognition. Practical cognition poses queries that are passed to epistemic cognition. These queries constitute the list of ultimate-epistemic-interests. When new queries are inserted into the list of ultimateepistemic-interests, epistemic cognition sets about trying to answer them. For example, when a new goal is adopted, practical cognition will query epistemic cognition about how to achieve that goal, and when epistemic cognition produces a plan for achieving it along with beliefs about the expected value of that plan, these beliefs are sent back to practical cognition, which decides whether to adopt and execute the plan.
I will not say more here about the system of epistemic cognition embodied in OSCAR. 1 For present purposes, all that is important is that the process of actually constructing plans for the achievement of goals is a process carried out by epistemic cognition. It is a complicated task, as is witnessed by the massive literature of AI planning theory. The topic of the present paper is the system of practical cognition that drives this epistemic cognition and uses its output. The combined system has the structure diagramed in figure 1.
Decision-Theoretic Planning
In philosophy, decision theory has focused on choosing between acts rather than plans, but I have recently argued [1992] that that is an inadequate approach to practical reasoning. Instead, we must choose between competing plans -complex programs for action -in terms of their expected values, and then choose acts on the basis of the plans prescribing them. I defended this claim by presenting intuitive counterexamples to the alternative approach in terms of acts rather than plans. Without trying to give a full defense of this view, let me illustrate its motivation with a simple example. Suppose we are faced with a simple maze. There are two doors into the maze, and four paths through the maze. The top two paths begin at door A and lead to payoffs of 12 utiles and 10 utiles, respectively. Which door should we enter? Clearly, we should enter door A and traverse the upper path. Now let us apply the decision-theoretic model. We must compare the expected utility of entering door A with the expected utility of entering door B. But what are these expected utilities? The payoff resulting from entering door A depends upon which plan we adopt for traversing the maze after entering door A. If we take the upper path we will receive 20 utiles, and if we take the second path we will receive 0 utiles. So our choice of a plan determines the payoff. In computing the expected utility of entering door A, we can either assume that we will take the upper path, or assume ignorance of which path we will take. If we assume ignorance, then it seems we should assign a probability of .5 to taking either path, and hence the expected utility of entering door A is 10 utiles and the expected utility of entering door B is 11 utiles. On this calculation, the decision-theoretic model prescribes entering door B, but that is the wrong answer! If we instead assume that if we enter door A we will take the upper path, and similarly if we enter door B, then we can compute the expected utilities to be 20 utiles and 12 utiles, respectively, and we get the correct prescription that we should enter door A. However, this assumes that we have some way of knowing that we will choose the upper path if we enter door A. This is typically something we do know about ourselves, but we are not entitled to use it here in computing the expected utility of entering door A because that would be circular. We only believe that we will traverse the upper path because we believe that is the rational thing to do. If we did not believe the latter then we would not normally believe that we will traverse the upper path. But the object of the exercise is to determine the rational thing to do, so we cannot just assume the solution to the decision problem in the course of computing the probabilities and utilities used in solving the problem. Second counterexample.
The upshot of this is that the decision-theoretic calculation yields the right answer only if we 4 have some way of choosing between different plans for traversing the maze prior to computing the expected utilities. If we have a way of choosing between different maze-traversal plans, then we can simply choose the best plan overall (not just the best plan that has us entering door A and the best plan that has us entering door B) and enter the door that plan prescribes. That is the solution to the decision problem. So to recapitulate, if we compute the expected utilities of entering the doors without first choosing which maze-traversal plan to adopt if we enter a given door, then the decision-theoretic model gives the wrong answer. But if we have a way of choosing between maze-traversal plans then there is no need to compute the expected utilities, because we should simply choose the best plan and execute it, and that will determine which door we enter. There are complicated ways of trying to circumvent this counterexample, and they are discussed at length in my [1992] . Rather than repeat that discussion, I am going to assume here that practical reasoning must proceed in terms of plans rather than individual acts. This enterprise proceeds by applying the machinery of standard decision theory to plans rather than acts, and is accordingly called "decision-theoretic planning" in AI. It is tempting to suppose that we can choose between competing plans by simply picking the plan with the higher expected value, and this has been the standard presumption in AI planning theory. But because plans are structured objects that can embed other plans within themselves, this turns out to be inadequate, as I will now demonstrate.
Consider a planning agent embedded in a realistic world in which both its goals and its knowledge change over time. What this rules out is the kind of toy planning problems often encountered in AI, where the planner has a small fixed set of goals and a fixed knowledge base and is able to plan once for all those goals simultaneously and then stop. As a real agent acquires more knowledge about its situation, it will typically form new goals, and possibly reject earlier goals. New goals may also be produced by internal considerations. For example, human beings get hungry, and batteries run down in robots. Internal sensors may then produce new goals in an automatic fashion.
Such a realistic planning agent exhibits two important characteristics. First, it is never finished planning. As new goals and knowledge arise, new planning will be required, and old plans may have to be revised or withdrawn. This is a continual, ongoing process. Some plans will be acted upon while others are still in the process of formation. The second characteristic is a corollary of the first. This is that the planning agent cannot confine its planning activities to global planning. It cannot be viewed as constructing one big global plan for a fixed set of goals. Instead, it must construct local plans for limited goals, adopting such plans provisionally, and then when conflicts are discovered between provisionally adopted plans, try to fix the conflicts by patching or replacing some of the plans. There are two separate reasons why the planner must engage in such local planning: (1) A real agent acquires a huge number of goals over an extended period of time, and planning for all of them simultaneously is too hard. (2) Having to plan for all of one's goals simultaneously would require continual replanning as goals change. Goals change much more rapidly than global replanning could occur, so the agent might never actually come up with any plans.
The upshot of this is that realistic planning must consist of (1) the provisional adoption of local plans, and (2) patching the set of adopted plans when conflicts are discovered. Now let us look at the application of decision-theoretic-planning to local plans.
The point of choosing plans is to direct activity. In a given situation, the considerations that make it reasonable to choose a plan must also make it reasonable to act upon it. An agent engaged in decision-theoretic-planning will (1) search for plans, (2) choose between competing plans that have been discovered, and (3) direct activity on the basis of the plans thus adopted. It must be emphasized that if it is reasonable to choose a plan, it must be reasonable to act upon it. This simple observation has the consequence that, given two competing plans, it is not automatically 5 reasonable to choose the plan with the higher expected value. This is because a single plan may aim to satisfy several different goals. The conflict may arise from small parts of the plans, and the plan having the higher expected value may get most of that value from other parts of the plan that do not conflict with its competitor. For instance, plan A might be the plan to run two errands on a single trip. The first errand consists of buying paint at a certain store, and the second errand consists of going to the grocery store. Plan B is the plan to buy paint at a different store, located just as conveniently close to the grocery store, but plan B does not include going to the grocery store. Let us suppose that buying paint from the second store would, by itself, be preferable to buying paint from the first store. Nevertheless, plan A may have a higher expected value than plan B just because it also acquires value as a result of the agent's going to the grocery store. Obviously, this would not be a reasonable basis for adopting plan A. Instead, the agent should construct a third plan C out of the parts of plans A and B. C consists of buying the paint at the second store and then going to the grocery store. This plan is preferable to either of A or B. Accordingly, an agent that has uncovered plans A and B should not choose A on the grounds that it has a higher expected value. Instead, the agent should consider the structural relationship between A and B and use that to propound and choose C. Note that this is exactly what a human being would do.
It is important to realize that in a situation like the above, A's having a higher expected value than B does not even give us a defeasible reason for choosing A. It cannot be presumed, without examination, that A's higher expected value is not simply a result of its being a more comprehensive plan, aimed at achieving more goals. No rational choice can be made without examining the structural relationships between the competing plans.
These problems would not arise in a planner that only had to choose between global plans. But that is not an option that is available to a realistic planning agent. Local plans must be constructed and adopted provisionally. By its very nature, local planning can produce plans that vary in comprehensiveness. One local plan may aim at some very specific goal, while another (like the plan of running several errands at once) may aim to achieve several goals. The search for such "composite plans" will be an important part of decision-theoretic-planning. But plans of varying comprehensiveness cannot be compared directly by looking at their expected values. That could be a matter of comparing apples and oranges.
A criterion of choice that accommodates the above considerations can be constructed as follows:
A plan σ is rationally preferable to a plan η iff there is a (possibly null) subplan µ of η and a composite σ+µ of σ and µ such that for every subplan ν of σ and a composite η+ν of η and ν, σ+µ is superior to η+ν.
I call this "the coextendability criterion". The relationship between the plans referenced in this criterion is diagramed in figure 3 . I propose that this criterion should be applied more or less directly by a decision-theoretic planner in choosing between competing plans. The criterion looks complicated, but the message is the fairly simple one that a planning agent cannot compare competing plans blindly by just looking at their expected values. Competing plans will typically vary in comprehensiveness, in which case a comparison of expected value tells us literally nothing. A planner must engage in a more complicated comparison that involves looking at the structures of the competing plans and seeking the best plan that can be constructed out of their subplans. This is a complex process, but no simpler comparison can carry any rational weight in the process of the agent's deciding what actions to take. 
Planning
Having seen how plans are to be compared, what is the process by which a rational agent produces plans and uses this criterion for choosing between them? A rational agent begins with primitive desires produced by epistemic cognition and optative dispositions, and then deliberates about how to satisfy those desires. The agent adopts plans on the basis of that deliberation. We can distinguish two central tasks within practical reasoning: (1) constructing and adopting plans; (2) directing activity given our desires and plans. We can think of (1) as being performed by a functional module called the PLANNER, and (2) by a functional module called the PLAN-EXECUTOR. Let us begin by looking at the PLANNER. We can usefully distinguish between three levels of planning. We plan for how to satisfy a primitive desire, we plan for how to perform the operations prescribed by other plans, and for when to perform them. I will refer to the first of these three kinds of plans as top-level plans, and the others as subsidiary plans. Planning for how to do something is teleological planning. This consists of means-end reasoning and general problem solving. Planning for when to do something is scheduling. Teleological planning and scheduling proceed in importantly different ways. When a teleological subsidiary plan is adopted, it is not integrated into the original plan. It is a separate plan that is called by the original plan. The original plan remains intact. But scheduling proceeds by modifying the original plan, adding timing instructions. The initial planning that transpires in response to the acquisition of primitive desires is top-level teleological planning. Such planning tends to be highly schematic. To focus on a concrete example, suppose I form the desire for my garage to look better. In response to that desire, I may adopt the top-level plan to paint it. Notice just how schematic this plan is. It contains no specification at all of how I will go about painting it or when I will do it. Having adopted this simple top-level plan, I must plan further. The adoption of this plan must somehow initiate subsidiary planning for how to paint the garage. The resulting subsidiary plan might take the following form:
1. Buy the paint. 2. Make sure the ladder is in good condition. 3. When the weather is good, paint each wall of the garage.
The structure of this plan can be represented more accurately by the following graph:
Buy the paint.
Check the condition of the ladder.
If the ladder is in good condition then when the weather is good paint each wall of the garage.
#1 #2

#3
Consider each plan-node. Node 1 is going to require further subsidiary planning. I must plan how to buy the paint, i.e., what kind of paint, what color, at what store I should buy it, how I will pay for it, etc. Node 2 illustrates something that is of considerable importance. Although checking the condition of the ladder is a rather complicated procedure, I need not plan for how to do it. This is because I "know how to do it". Such knowledge consists of a stored plan schema that I am able to retrieve and act upon whenever I want to check the condition of a ladder. I will call such stored plan schemas standing plans. Node 3 is somewhat similar, because again, I know how to paint the wall of a garage. Having constructed this subsidiary plan for how to paint my garage, and perhaps a further subsidiary plan for node 1, I am still not ready to paint my garage. That is because nothing in this plan tells me when to do anything. Node 3 does contain a timing-condition, but it is a very indefinite one. As it stands, I can execute this plan at any future time as long as the weather is good when I do the actual painting. This plan cries out for scheduling. I must decide when to buy the paint, when to check the ladder, and when to do the actual painting. This requires further subsidiary planning. It must eventually be determined exactly when operations are to be performed, but my initial scheduling may be much more indefinite than that. For example, I may decide to buy the paint tomorrow. That leaves undetermined just when tomorrow I will do it. When tomorrow rolls around, I must do some more specific scheduling. At that point I may decide to buy the paint in the afternoon. But that is still pretty indefinite. As the day progresses and I get a better picture of what I must do during the day, I will be in a position to decide more precisely just when I will buy the paint. Knowing that I am going to the grocery store after lunch, I may decide to pick up the paint on my way to the grocery store. Notice that I may also wait until making this decision to decide just where to buy the paint. Because I am going to buy it while on my way to the grocery store, it may be more convenient to buy it at one paint store (The Flaming Rainbow) rather than another, and so I choose my paint store on that basis. Let me summarize my conclusions so far. First, our top-level plans tend to be very schematic.
9 2 This is a familiar point in AI planning theory. Such planning is called "hierarchical". (See Sacerdotti [1975] and [1977] .) Adopting a schematic plan must lead to the initiation of further subsidiary planning.
2 Second, our teleological planning typically leaves the scheduling of nodes quite indefinite. At some point, further scheduling must occur. Third, some aspects of teleological planning may depend upon decisions regarding scheduling, so scheduling and teleological planning must be interleaved. The PLANNER can be viewed as having three components. There must be a component that initiates planning when new primitive desires are acquired; there must be a component that actually does the planning, constructing new plans that thereby become candidates for adoption; and there must be a component that determines whether to adopt a candidate plan. These are the PLANNING-INITIATOR, the PLAN-SYNTHESIZER, and the PLAN-UPDATER, respectively. As I conceive it, the PLANNING-INITIATOR responds to the acquisition of new desires. It is the trigger that begins the process of planning. As such, it can initiate the operation of the PLAN-SYNTHESIZER. The PLAN-SYNTHESIZER produces new plans that are put in a database of candidate-plans. The PLAN-SYNTHESIZER is responsible for both teleological planning and scheduling. The PLAN-UPDATER is responsible for all changes in what plans are adopted. Such a change can consist of either the adoption of a new candidate plan or the withdrawal of a previously adopted plan. This somewhat more detailed understanding of the PLANNER allows us to diagram it as in figure four.
The PLAN-UPDATER
From a philosophical point of view, the most interesting problems arising out of this picture concern the PLAN-UPDATER, which is responsible for the adoption and retraction of plans. What are the criteria that should be employed by the PLAN-UPDATER in deciding what plans to adopt? At this point it is useful to distinguish between a theory of reasoning and a theory of warrant. A theory of reasoning tells us how a rational agent should proceed in drawing conclusions at any given point. Reasoning is defeasible in the sense that it can lead to the adoption of a conclusion at one time and then mandate its retraction later, either as a result of additional reasoning, or as a result of the acquisition of new information. If a rational agent has reasoned correctly up to the present time, then in one sense of "justified" its conclusions are justified. As a result of further reasoning, and without any new input, some of those conclusions may become unjustified, and may subsequently become justified again, and so on. Warranted conclusions are conclusions that would be justified "in the long run". More precisely, a potential conclusion is warranted iff, if reasoning could proceed without limit, a point would be reached where the conclusion would become justified and would never subsequently become unjustified just as a result of further reasoning.
Warrant is an ideal notion. It is, in a certain sense, the target at which a reasoner aims. A theory of practical warrant can reasonably appeal to all possible plans:
The decision to adopt a plan σ is practically warranted iff there is no (logically constructible) plan that is rationally preferable to σ.
As a theory of warrant, this may be reasonable, but as a theory of practical reasoning, it would be preposterous. We cannot require a rational agent to survey all possible plans before deciding what to do. In practical deliberation, epistemic reasoning will produce candidate plans to be considered for adoption, and then a theory of practical reasoning should tell us what conclusions to draw on the basis of the consideration of a limited (usually very small) set of candidate plans. Given that we have tried to construct relevant plans in a reasonable way and have reached justified conclusions about their expected values, how can we make a justified decision about what acts to perform? As a first approximation we might try the following:
The decision to adopt a plan σ is practically justified iff a rationally satisfactory search for plans has been conducted and it led to the discovery of no plan that we are justified in believing to be rationally preferable to σ.
The main problem with this initial formulation turns upon the fact that we can have two competing plans neither of which is preferable to the other. In such a case, let us say that the two plans are tied. Following Bratman [1987] , I call such cases "Buridan cases".
To make progress with Buridan cases, we must first understand what it is for plans to compete. Competing plans are plans that in some sense conflict, so that the agent cannot reasonably adopt them both. Standard decision-theory takes the notion of competing alternatives as primitive and unanalyzed, but we must do better if we are to incorporate it into the design of a rational agent. Under what circumstances must the agent choose between plans? It is initially tempting to suppose that plans compete iff it is impossible for both plans to be successfully executed. But this is much too strong a notion of competition. Plans can "interfere" with each other without rendering one another impossible. For example, executing one plan may make it more difficult to execute another. This can happen because the agent becomes tired, consumes resources, is left further from some important location, etc. Executing one plan may also affect the expected values of other plans by changing the values of the goals at which they aim. For example, drinking orange juice becomes less desirable after eating a dill pickle. All of these considerations can make it desirable to choose between two plans rather than executing both. A first attempt at capturing this notion of competition is as follows:
Two plans A and B compete strictly iff every composite of A and B has a lower expected value than the maximum of the expected values of A and B alone.
This analysis proceeds in terms of the notion of composites of two plans, which I assume to make sense, but its precise definition will turn on the kinds of plans envisioned. I will also help myself to the notion of one plan being a subplan of (contained in) another.
The idea behind strict competition is that plans compete just in case it would be better to execute one rather than both. Strict competition would be a satisfactory criterion for competition if we had only global plans to compare, but for rather subtle reasons, it fails for local plans. The difficulty is that if A and B are multi-step plans, then even though there is a composite A+B having a higher expected value than either A or B, we may still not want to execute both A and B. This is because there may be a third plan C such that (1) A is a subplan of C, (2) C is a subplan of A+B, and (3) C has a higher expected value than any of A, B, or A+B. For instance, consider a human agent that finds itself in the embarrassing position of having social commitments to have dinner at two different places (and times) the same evening. Plan A is the plan to eat a normal dinner at Jones' house, and plan B is the plan to eat a normal dinner at Smith's house. The situation may be such that it would be better to do both rather than just one, despite the predictable intestinal discomfort. Thus the two plans do not compete strictly. But perhaps a better alternative is to attend both dinner parties, eating a normal meal at Jones' house, but then eating only desert at Smith's house. This is a plan C that is constructed out of plan A and just part of plan B. The availability of this plan makes it preferable not to adopt A+B. On the other hand, because A is a subplan of C, executing C involves executing A. So it seems reasonable to say that there is a conflict between A and B, and that A should be chosen (as part of C).
This notion of competition can be made precise as follows:
A and B compete iff there is a composite A+B of A and B and a subplan C of A+B such that (1) either A or B is a subplan of C, (2) the expected value of C is greater than that of either composite of A and B.
It can be proven that if one plan is rationally preferable to another, in the sense of the coextendability criterion adumbrated above, then they compete in the present sense (see my [1992] ). Note that for global plans, this concept of competition reduces to strict competition, because global plans cannot be subplans of one another. Now let us return to Buridan cases. Buridan cases are cases in which competing plans are tied. The basic observation about Buridan cases is that in deciding what actions to perform, a rational agent chooses at random between the tied plans. However, this is only a remark about the actions performed as a result of the planning, and not directly a remark about the planning process. At some point a random choice must be made, but that could be either (1) a random choice between competing plans, resulting in one of the tied plans being adopted at random, or (2) a random choice between the actions dictated by the tied plans, without either of the tied plans ever being adopted in its own right. This is really a question about the control structure of the rational agent. At what point in the architecture is the random choice made? The simplest suggestion would be that a random choice between plans is made immediately upon producing the competing plans. However, it takes little reflection to see that, in human beings, things are more complicated than that. Returning to the example of painting my garage, a decision had to be made about where to buy the paint. Suppose there were two paint stores between which I could not initially decide. Eventually, I decided on The Flaming Rainbow, because it was on my route to the grocery store. That made the plan to buy the paint there preferable to the plan to buy it at the other store. But what happened prior to my deciding to go to the grocery store? I did not initially decide at random to buy the paint at one of the stores, and then later change my mind because I had a better reason to buy it at the other store. What I did was decide to either buy the paint at The Flaming Rainbow or buy it at The Chartreuse Flamingo, but I did not at that point decide arbitrarily to adopt one plan rather than the other. Instead, I stored the set consisting of the two competing plans and waited until I had some basis for choosing between them.
This indicates that if an agent has a set Σ of plans that are tied and between which it cannot decide, the rational decision is the disjunctive decision to execute one of these plans. Eventually the agent must decide between the plans, and if there is still no objective basis for doing so then the decision must be made at random. The time at which a decision must finally be made is the time at which one of the plans in Σ first requires something be done. This requires some small changes in the architecture of the PLANNER as it has so far been described. Specifically, the list of adopted-plans must either be replaced by or augmented by a list of disjunctively-adopted-plan-sets.
The preceding remarks apply to teleological planning, but much the same thing is true of scheduling. Scheduling tends to be a matter of continually refining previous schedules as the agent acquires new information or adopts new plans to be fitted into the schedule. For example, in deciding when to buy the paint for my garage, I schedule the purchase more and more precisely as time passes. First, I planned (yesterday) to buy the paint today. Then I planned to buy it this afternoon. Then I planned to buy it on my way to the grocery store. In this way I generate increasingly precise schedules. But it is important to realize that I may never generate an absolutely precise schedule. As a consequence of this, at any given time it will typically be the case that nodes from many different plans have been called, their timing-conditions are satisfied, and they are waiting to be executed by having their operations performed. For instance, I plan to call my travel agent sometime this afternoon to check on my car rental in New Zealand, I plan to start the barbecue pretty soon to fix dinner, I plan to run out to the mailbox and retrieve my mail before it gets dark, and so forth. All three of these plans have nodes that have been called and are awaiting execution. The timing-conditions are sufficiently broad that I can successfully execute them any time during the next several hours. I might engage in further planning and refine my schedule for when to do them, but more likely a time will come when I just decide to do one of them, and then later I will decide to do another, and so on. These decisions are the work of the PLAN-EXECUTOR, not the PLANNER.
The fact that schedules are left flexible until we acquire a good reason for refining them in some way indicates that, like teleological planning, we do not choose arbitrarily between tied schedules until we have to. When we have several competing candidate schedules, we normally select one only if it is preferable to all the others. There is, however, one important difference between tied schedules and tied teleological plans. Usually, tied schedules differ only in their scheduling of some particular node (or nodes) within a continuous temporal interval. For example, I may have good reason to buy the paint between 2 PM and 3 PM, but not have any reason to prefer one time in that interval to any other time. Rather than choosing randomly to buy the paint at some particular instant, I leave unspecified when exactly to buy the paint, deciding merely to buy it sometime between 2 PM and 3 PM. The times between 2 PM and 3 PM are preferable to other times, but tied among each other. In effect, I am undecided between infinitely many absolutely precise schedules, but I can represent that whole set of schedules with one imprecise schedule which can be adopted as a single plan rather than disjunctively adopting the infinite set of more precise plans. This will not always be the case, but it is frequently the case. This is an important difference between tied schedules and tied teleological plans.
These remarks suggest the following principle for rational plan adoption.
(PA) The decision to disjunctively adopt a set of plans Σ is practically justified iff (1) a rationally satisfactory search for plans has been conducted, and (2) either: (i) Σ has a single member σ, and for every plan µ discovered by the plan search, if we are justified in believing that µ competes with σ, then we are justified in believing that σ is preferable to µ (in this case, σ is adopted outright); or (ii) (a) Σ has more than one member, and any two members of Σ are justifiably believed to compete, (b) the plan search has led to the discovery of no plan that we are justified in believing to be rationally preferable to any member of Σ, and (c) for every plan µ not in Σ, if µ is justifiably believed to compete with every member of Σ, then some member of Σ is justifiably believed to be preferable to µ.
Defeasible Reasons for Plan Adoptions
Principle (PA) makes essential reference to the concept of a rationally satisfactory search for plans. Just what does that involve? It might be supposed that a rationally satisfactory search must at least produce all of the "most obvious" candidate plans before the agent is justified in adopting the best candidate plan. But this proposal should be rejected. A crucial feature of reasoning is that it must be "interruptible". In general, there will always be more reasoning that could be done, but the agent may have to take action before it can do more reasoning. Rational thought must be such that, when the agent has to act, it is reasonable to act on the basis of its current justified conclusions, even if there always remains the possibility of those conclusions being retracted at a later time. This is an essential characteristic of justification, either epistemic or practical. This is virtually a definition of justification -justified conclusions are those it is reasonable to act upon at the present time.
A noteworthy fact about human beings is that in many (perhaps most) cases of routine planning, no more than a single plan for achieving a particular goal is ever produced. We do not generate a large number of different candidate plans and then choose between them. We produce a single plan, and if it is "sufficiently good", we are willing to act upon it without engaging in further search. This is essentially Herbert Simon's [1977] observation that we often satisfice rather than maximize. One plan that is always available to us is the null plan (the empty set of instructions), which has an expected-value of zero. For any other plan to be such that it is reasonable to act upon it, the agent must reasonably believe that it is better than the null plan, i.e., that it has a positive expected-value. Let us take this to be our official definition of a plan being minimally good. My suggestion is that if, at the time an agent must act, only a single new plan has been uncovered, and to the best of the agent's knowledge it does not compete with any of the previously adopted plans, then it is reasonable to act upon that plan iff the agent justifiably believes that it is a minimally good plan. This suggests in turn that as soon as a plan is discovered and evaluated as minimally good, it becomes defeasibly reasonable to adopt that plan. This practical decision must be defeasible, however, because if another plan is subsequently produced and judged to be preferable to the first, then the adoption of the first plan should be retracted and the new plan adopted in its place. Given the right structure for rationally satisfactory searches, the following principle captures the preceding observations and can be regarded as a corollary of (PA):
(P1) -σ is a minimally good plan› is a defeasible reason for adopting σ.
Principle (P1) formulates only a defeasible reason for adopting σ. To get a grasp of what the defeaters for (P1) should be, suppose the plan search produces a new candidate plan σ, and the agent must decide whether to adopt it. There are four possibilities: (a) the agent might simply adopt σ; (b) the agent might adopt σ while retracting the adoption of some previously adopted plans or disjunctive set of plans to which σ is rationally preferable; (c) the agent might decline to adopt σ on the grounds that it competes with another plan that is rationally preferable to it; (d) the agent might incorporate σ into a disjunctive set of tied plans and disjunctively adopt the set.
In deciding whether to adopt σ, the agent should first check to see whether σ is minimally good. If it is, then the agent has a defeasible reason for adopting it. If the agent is unaware of any conflicts with previously adopted plans, then σ should be adopted. In other words, the agent is in situation (a). But if the agent notes that a plan α that competes with σ has also been adopted, the agent must investigate whether σ is preferable to α. If σ is judged to be preferable to α, then the agent has a defeasible reason for adopting σ and retracting α. This is situation (b). If the agent judges α to be preferable to σ, then it should decline to adopt σ but retain α. This is situation (c). Situations (b) and (c) could be handled with the help of a single defeater for (P1):
-α is justifiably believed to be rationally preferable to σ› is a defeater for (P1).
However, this defeater need not be adopted as a separate principle because it is a consequence of a more general defeater that is needed to handle situation (d):
(P2) -α is justifiably believed to compete with σ and σ is not justifiably believed to be preferable to α› is a defeater for (P1).
plan-sets. In this case, we need a principle supplementing (P1) that governs disjunctive adoption:
(P3) -α 1 ,...,α n are justifiably believed to compete pairwise, each is justifiably believed to be minimally good, and none is justifiably believed to be preferable to another› is a prima facie reason for disjunctively adopting {α 1 ,...,α n }.
Note that (P1) is a special case of (P3). Furthermore, the defeater formulated by (P2) should also be a defeater for (P3):
(P4) -α is justifiably believed to compete with each of α 1 ,...,α n and no α i is justifiably believed to be preferable to α› is a defeater for (P3).
Reasoning with principles (P1)-(P4) should lead to the same disjunctive adoptions as reasoning with principle (PA).
The PLAN-SYNTHESIZER
In order to use (P1)-(P4), epistemic cognition must supply the PLANNER with suitable plans. The search for plans is directed by the PLAN-SYNTHESIZER, which is actived by the adoption of new goals. The PLAN-SYNTHESIZER does it job by passing two tasks to epistemic cognition. The teleological task is the task of constructing a plan for the satisfaction of that desire which is minimally good. 4 If the desire is an instrumental desire (that is, the desire to perform some step of another plan), the scheduling task is the task of looking for ways of improving the plan that generated the desire by inserting timing instructions.
Suppose epistemic cognition concludes that a certain plan is a minimally good one for satisfying some desire. This conclusion is passed to the PLAN-UPDATER. Suppose the PLAN-UPDATER adopts the plan. It is natural to suppose that this should lead to a cancellation of the search for plans aimed at satisfying that desire. However, adopting a plan for the satisfaction of a desire should not make us totally oblivious to better plans if they come along. For example, suppose I need something at the grocery store, and the only way to get there is to walk, so despite the fact that it is raining, I adopt the plan to walk. Then a friend offers me a lift. I am, and should be, able to appreciate the fact that this enables me to construct a better plan for getting to the grocery store and making my purchase. However, if I had no interest at all in finding plans for getting to the grocery store, I would be unable to draw that conclusion. Adopting one plan for getting to the grocery store certainly relieves some of the urgency in looking for other plans, but it should not cancel interest in them altogether. What it must do is simply lower the degree of interest in finding such plans, thus making the search for such plans a matter of lower priority.
At this point it becomes useful to separate subsidiary teleological planning and scheduling and look at each by itself, because the differences between them become important.
Subsidiary teleological planning
If (1) a plan for the satisfaction of a desire were "perfect", in the sense that it is certain to result in the satisfaction of the desire without attenuating its value, (2) the probability of its successful execution were 1, and (3) its execution were costless, then there could never be a 15 ever be perfect in this sense. As long as a plan is less than certain to succeed and has some execution cost, there is always the possibility of finding a better plan. The expected-value of a perfect plan for satisfying a desire is simply the product of the strength of the desire and the estimated probability of the desire not being satisfied without our doing anything. The expectedvalue of a plan aimed at satisfying several desires is the sum of these products for the different desires. Let the degree of imperfection of a plan be the difference between this figure and its expected-value. When the PLAN-UPDATER adopts a plan for the satisfaction of a desire or set of desires, the degree of interest epistemic cognition should retain in finding additional plans for the satisfaction of that desire or set of desires should be determined by the degree of imperfection of the adopted plan. Furthermore, the remaining interest should be changed to an interest in finding plans rationally preferable to the one already found.
Scheduling
Similar observations can be made about scheduling. However, we must be more careful than we have been in formulating the scheduling task the PLAN-SYNTHESIZER passes to epistemic cognition. Let us call the node from which an instrumental desire is derived its parent node, and the plan of which it is a node its parent plan. As a first approximation, the scheduling task is that of adding scheduling instructions to the parent node in such a way that the resulting plan is rationally preferable to the original parent plan. This account of the scheduling task is a bit simplistic, however. Scheduling usually consists of coordinating steps from different plans, in which case the scheduling links tie together steps from the different plans. In this case the objective should be to produce a composite plan rationally preferable to the union of the originally separate subplans.
Given this understanding of the scheduling task, suppose epistemic cognition produces such a composite plan and the PLAN-UPDATER adopts it. A rational agent will still be sensitive to the discovery of better ways of scheduling the node in question, so adopting this schedule should not result in a complete cancellation of interest in other schedules, but as in the case of subsidiary teleological planning, it should result in diminished interest in such schedules. This degree of interest should be determined by the degree of imperfection of the adopted schedule. It should also change our interest from scheduling the node to scheduling it in a way rationally preferable to the adopted plan.
Scheduling tends to be unstable. This is for two reasons. First, as time passes, an agent acquires new desires. For example, suppose I plan to sit at my desk writing all morning. But then I develop a craving for a cup of coffee. To accommodate this desire, I may change my plan and decide to get up and fix a cup of coffee as soon as I come to a convenient break in my work. This can also lead to reversing previous scheduling decisions. For instance, I might also have planned to make a phone call when I break for lunch, but it may occur to me that I can do that while I am waiting for the coffee to brew, and so I rearrange my schedule accordingly. It is to accommodate new desires that we leave schedules as indefinite as possible and do not choose arbitrarily between tied schedules.
Another way in which scheduling tends to change over time is that it tends to get more precise as I acquire more information. For instance, in planning to paint my garage, I initially planned to buy paint sometime today. Then when I acquired the belief that I would be passing close to the paint store on the way to the grocery store, I planned more precisely to buy paint on my way to the grocery store. As the time for action approaches, we tend to learn more and more about what else will be happening, and we can use that to refine our schedule.
Both of these kinds of changes will occur automatically as long as epistemic cognition retains interest in finding preferable schedules. When the information becomes available that makes it possible to construct preferable schedules, epistemic cognition will do so as long as it does not 16 have to do more important reasoning that interferes.
The preceding observations can be combined into the rather simple architecture for the PLAN-SYNTHESIZER that is diagramed in figure five. 
The Doxastification of Planning
For two different reasons, practical reasoning is defeasible. First, practical decisions are based upon beliefs supplied by epistemic cognition. If those beliefs are retracted, the practical decisions based upon them must also be retracted. Second, plan adoption proceeds in accordance with principles (P1)-(P4), and those are themselves principles of defeasible practical reasoning. This introduces an important complication into the theory of practical rationality. It is insufficient to just state the defeasible reasons and defeaters for practical reasoning. We must also describe the structure of the reasoning itself. This is no simple task. The literature on defeasible epistemic reasoning makes it apparent just how complex this is. Defeasible practical reasoning promises to be equally complex. Must we construct an entire inference engine for defeasible practical reasoning? Reflection on human thought suggests an intriguing way of handling this. Rather than requiring separate computational modules for defeasible epistemic reasoning and defeasible practical reasoning, human cognition sometimes makes do with a single module dedicated to epistemic reasoning, and then integrates practical reasoning into that module using a technical trick. The trick involves "doxastifying" normative judgments. Corresponding to the adoption of a plan is the "epistemic judgment" (i.e., belief) that it should be an adopted plan. This judgment can be epistemic in name only. It requires no "objective fact" to anchor it or give it truth conditions. It is merely a computational device whose sole purpose is to allow us to use defeasible epistemic reasoning to accomplish defeasible practical reasoning. Let us abbreviate -σ should be an adopted plan› (where this is a practical 'should' -not a moral 'should') as -σ is adoptable›. Similarly, let us say that a set of plans is disjunctively-adoptable iff it should be disjunctively adopted. A plan is adoptable iff its unit set is disjunctively-adoptable. Then principles (P1)-(P4) can be rewritten as rules for epistemic reasoning about plans being adoptable and sets of plans being disjunctively-adoptable.
Consider the following array of epistemic prima facie reasons and defeaters:
(E1) -σ is a minimally good plan› is a defeasible reason for -σ is adoptable›.
(E2a) -α competes with σ and α is minimally good› is a defeasible undercutting defeater for (E1).
(E2b) -σ is preferable to α› is a conclusive undercutting defeater for (E2a).
(E3) -α 1 ,...,α n compete pairwise and each is minimally good› is a prima facie reason for -{α 1 ,...,α n } is disjunctively-adoptable›.
(E4a) -One of α 1 ,...,α n preferable to another› is a conclusive undercutting defeater for (E3).
(E4b) -α is minimally good and competes with each of α 1 ,...,α n › is a defeasible undercutting defeater for (E3).
(E4c) -Some α i is preferable to α› is a conclusive undercutting defeater for (E4b).
With this array of prima facie reasons and defeaters, the epistemic reasoner will conclude that a plan is adoptable iff a properly constructed defeasible practical reasoner would adopt the plan, and it will conclude that a set of plans is disjunctively-adoptable iff a properly constructed defeasible practical reasoner would disjunctively adopt the set of plans. 5 To illustrate, suppose we have a prima facie reason of the form (P1) for adopting σ, but we also have a defeater of the form (P2). Then we will have a prima facie reason of the form (E1) for concluding that σ is 18 5 The defeasible theoretical reasoner works by adopting interest in defeaters whenever it makes a defeasible inference. Preference between plans results from relations betrween composites of subplans of those plans. For rules (E1)-(E4c) to work properly, the reasoner must consider those composite plans that generate preference relations and consider whether they should be adopted in place of the plans that are first proposed. This must be built into the interest rules governing the evaluation of plans. adoptable, and a defeater of the form (E2a) for this prima facie reason, and we will lack a defeater defeater of the form (E2b). The upshot of this is that the same practical reasoning can be accomplished by coupling the defeasible epistemic reasoner with a much simpler practical reasoner that adopts or retracts plans on the basis of epistemic judgments to the effect that they are or are not adoptable.
It is important to realize that the terms 'adoptable' (or 'should be adopted') and 'disjunctivelyadoptable' are not given definitions in this account. They are just placeholders in epistemic reasoning. Their purpose is to give the reasoning the right structure to implement the planning architecture. I will refer to this reduction of defeasible practical reasoning to defeasible epistemic reasoning as the doxastification of practical reasoning, because it reduces defeasible practical reasoning to epistemic reasoning about beliefs.
The doxastification of practical reasoning has the result that most of the work of plan updating is done by the epistemic reasoner rather than by the PLAN-UPDATER itself. Doxastification is an extremely powerful device, and it has the consequence that the PLAN-UPDATER can be quite simple. The PLAN-SYNTHESIZER poses questions for epistemic cognition regarding the adoptability of plans satisfying certain constraints, and then epistemic cognition goes its merry way. In particular, it will adopt, and sometimes withdraw, beliefs to the effect that various plans are adoptable. All the PLAN-UPDATER must do is respond to changes in beliefs of the form -σ is adoptable›. When such a belief is adopted, the PLAN-UPDATER adopts σ, and when such a belief is withdrawn, the PLAN-UPDATER retracts the adoption of σ. It was observed earlier that when the adoption of a plan is retracted, this must reinitiate planning for the satisfaction of the desires the retracted plan aimed at satisfying. But this is now automatic. Whenever the epistemic reasoner retracts a belief in which it was originally interested, that has the effect of reawakening interest in it. Similarly, if the epistemic reasoner is looking for a variable-binding that satisfies a certain formula, and it acquires an appropriate belief (a belief in an instance of the formula), then if it subsequently retracts that belief, that will automatically lead it to reopen the search for variable bindings.
That latter is what is involved in the search for plans, so the search for plans will automatically be reopened without any new instructions having to be passed to the epistemic reasoner.
A Doxastic Implementation of Practical Reasoning
The doxastification of plan adoption has implications for the rest of the planning architecture. The lists of adopted-plans and disjunctively-adopted-plan-sets are encoded as beliefs about adoptability and disjunctive-adoptability. For the rest of the PLANNER to make use of these beliefs, it must either respond to the beliefs directly, or use the beliefs to construct the associated lists and then perform computations on the lists. Reflection upon the latter alternative indicates that it would introduce serious complications into the architecture, because if the adoptability-beliefs are subsequently withdrawn, the lists must be adjusted accordingly, and computations based upon them must also be adjusted. In other words, the rest of the practical reasoner must also operate defeasibly. This suggests a thorough-going doxastification of the entire architecture. The trick to achieving this consists of making use of the full structure of ultimate-epistemic-interests.
First, I have talked about practical cognition sending queries to epistemic cognition by placing the queries in ultimate-epistemic-interests, but that need not be the only source of ultimate epistemic interests. It is compatible with the architecture for there to be a list of permanent-ultimateepistemic-interests that are in ultimate-epistemic-interests from the start, without having to be placed there by practical cognition. Second, recall that an ultimate epistemic interest encodes a query, together with a degree of interest and an instruction for what to do with an answer. The latter instruction can be of any kind. In particular, it can tell the reasoner to insert another query into ultimate-epistemic-interests. With these observations, suppose we supply epistemic cognition with the following permanent-ultimate-epistemic-interests and supplement (E1)-(E4c) with the following prima facie reasons and defeaters: permanent-ultimate-epistemic-interests:
(U1) Find a w such that w is an suitable goal.
When the belief that w is an suitable goal is produced:
insert -Find an x such that x is a minimally good plan for achieving w› into ultimateepistemic-interests.
(U2) Find an x such that x is an adoptable plan. When this belief is acquired:
insert -Find a y such that y is a plan for achieving the same goals as x and y is rationally preferable to x› into ultimate-epistemic-interests. (U3) Find an x such that x is a disjunctively-adoptable plan-set.
When the belief that x is a disjunctively-adoptable plan-set is produced, for each member of x:
insert -If x is to be executed, the first step must be performed now› into ultimate-
epistemic-interests.
When this belief is acquired, choose some x in y at random, and have introspection supply the belief that x was randomly chosen for adoption.
forwards directed prima facie reasons:
(E5) Desiring w is a prima facie reason for believing -w is an suitable goal›.
(E6) -x is an adoptable plan and w is a situation-type consisting of executing a non-basic node of x if it is called› is a prima facie reason for -w is an suitable goal›. (A non-basic node is one whose operation is not a basic act.)
forwards directed conclusive reasons:
(E7) -w is a situation-type having positive relative expected situation-liking› is a conclusive reason for -w is an suitable goal›. (E8) -y is a disjunctively-adoptable plan-set, and x was chosen randomly from the members of y› is a conclusive reason for -x is an adoptable plan›.
backwards directed conclusive reasons:
(E9) -x is a situation-type having a non-positive relative expected situation-liking› is a conclusive reason for -x is not an suitable goal›.
(E10) -x is a situation-type having a non-positive relative expected situation-liking› is a conclusive undercutting defeater for (E5).
These will combine to give us the reasoning diagramed in figure six. The arrows of the form ' ' signify that finding an instance of one member of ultimate-epistemic-interests leads to the insertion of a new query. To see how this works, let us step through the operation of a reasoner supplied with these permanent-ultimate-epistemic-interests and reasons. The reasoner begins with a permanent interest in finding suitable goals. 'suitable goal' is now treated as an undefined placeholder, just like 'adoptable plan' or 'disjunctively-adoptable plan-set'. It is a paraphrase of 'goal that should (from a practical point of view) be adopted'. The reasoner has three ways of finding suitable goals. If optative dispositions produce the desire for w, by (E5), this constitutes a prima facie reason for concluding that w is an suitable goal. This automatically queries epistemic cognition about whether w is a situation-type having positive relative expected situation-liking, because the defeasible epistemic reasoner always adopts interest in defeaters for its inferences, and (E10) formulates a defeater for (E5). (E7) formulates the "direct epistemic reason" for adopting goals. I will discuss (E6) below.
Once the reasoner concludes that w is a suitable goal, in accordance with (U1), it sends an interest in finding minimally good plans for achieving w to ultimate-epistemic-interests. This leads to the epistemic reasoning that constitutes plan synthesis. The reasoning leading to the search for plans will be prioritized by epistemic cognition according to the degree of interest attached to finding the plan, and that will be determined by the importance of the goal.
When the reasoner draws the conclusion that a plan is minimally good, this leads, via (E1) or (E3), to the conclusion that it is adoptable or a member of a disjunctively-adoptable plan-set. In the latter case, in accordance with (U3), a query is sent to ultimate-epistemic-interests leading the reasoner to attend to the conditions under which a choice must be made between the members of the plan-set. When the reasoner concludes that a choice must be made, that is done and the information that it was done is supplied via introspection (still in accordance with (U3)) and constitutes a reason (by (E8)) for concluding that the randomly selected plan is adoptable.
When it is concluded that a plan is adoptable, (E6) provides a reason for thinking that executing its nodes if they are called constitutes an suitable goal. This corresponds to the production of instrumental desires.
The upshot of this is that the apparently complex dynamics of plan adoption and modification, and of scheduling, need not be handled in an ad hoc way in a rational agent in which practical reasoning is doxastified. These complex dynamics result in a natural way from the functioning of defeasible epistemic reasoning and its employment in the practical reasoner.
The PLAN-EXECUTOR
The PLAN-EXECUTOR is the module that executes plans. It will proceed roughly as follows: (1) Call initial nodes, and execute them. (2) Recursively execute nodes called by nodes that have already been executed.
Several complications must be addressed. First, the epistemic reasoning presupposed by plan execution is defeasible, and the PLAN-EXECUTOR must accommodate that. The way to do that is, once more, through the doxastification of practical reasoning. As in the PLANNER, doxastification will allow the bulk of the reasoning involved in plan execution to be done by epistemic cognition. Second, having adopted a plan and begun its execution, a rational agent does not proceed blindly come-what-may. A rational agent monitors the course of plan execution. If things do not go as anticipated, the execution of the plan may be aborted. This monitoring consists of keeping a continual check on whether the part of the plan remaining to be executed (the tail of the plan) is, under the present circumstances, an adoptable plan in its own right. The computational module that does this will be called the TAIL-MONITOR. As long as the TAIL-MONITOR does not abort plan execution, the PLAN-EXECUTOR will proceed recursively to execute nodes as they are called.
A common phenomenon will be that the tail of the plan is modified by further scheduling as plan execution proceeds. Typically, as we see how the execution of a complex plan develops and what is true of our current situation, we will acquire reasons for scheduling the remaining nodes more precisely than we did before plan execution began. This has the effect, via the TAIL-MONITOR, of replacing the tail of the plan by a modification of it that involves further scheduling, adopting that modification, and then beginning its execution. Of course, it too may be modified as execution progresses. Schematically, the PLAN-EXECUTOR can be regarded, as in figure 7 , as consisting of a loop. The loop begins by retrieving a node from a list of called-nodes (originally the initial-nodes of top-level adopted plans). It checks to see whether the preconditions are satisfied. It does this by passing that question to epistemic cognition. If it is determined that the preconditions are not satisfied, execution of that node terminates. If it is determined that the preconditions are satisfied, the PLAN-EXECUTOR instructs epistemic cognition to become interested (and remain interested) in whether the timing-condition is satisfied. If at some point epistemic cognition produces the belief that the timing-condition is satisfied, it passes this information back to the PLAN-EXECUTOR. The PLAN-EXECUTOR then passes the operation of the node to the ACTION-INITIATOR, along with the subsidiary plan for its exectuion if there is one. The ACTION-INITIATOR will be discussed further below. Among other things, it resolves last-minute scheduling questions. When it chooses an operation for execution, it checks to see whether it is accompanied by an execution plan. If not, the operation is assumed to be a basic act, for the performance of which the agent has hardwired routines. Those routines are then executed mechanically. If instead there is an execution plan, its initial nodes are inserted into the list of called-nodes, and its execution begins. If a time comes when the TAIL-MONITOR decides the plan is no longer executable even if a subsidiary plan is adopted, then execution will be aborted. The ACTION-INITIATOR must monitor the execution of an operation to ensure that it is successful. It does this by querying epistemic cognition. If epistemic cognition concludes that the operation was successfully executed, the PLAN-EXECUTOR concludes that the node was executed, and updates the list of called-nodes and inserts the new tails that begin with each newly called node into the set of adopted-plans. Then the whole routine begins again.
Running in parallel with this is the TAIL-MONITOR. As soon as a node is called, the TAIL-MONITOR instructs epistemic cognition to be continually interested in whether the tail of the plan is adoptable. If at any point epistemic cognition concludes that it is not, the TAIL-MONITOR aborts the plan execution. The epistemic conclusion that the tail is not adoptable may be accompanied by another epistemic conclusion to the effect that a modification of it is adoptable, and then the PLAN-EXECUTOR will automatically begin executing the modification just as it executes other adopted plans.
It would be straightforward to write a program to perform these operations mechanically, but that would not accommodate the defeasability of the agent's access to whether preconditions and timing-conditions are satisfied, operations have been successfully executed, etc. If the agent's beliefs about these matters change, this must alter the course of plan execution. It seems that the best way to handle this is by doxastifying plan execution. In other words, implement the PLAN-EXECUTOR in terms of epistemic reasoning. This can be done by making one addition to the permanent-ultimate-epistemic-interests, and adding the following reason schemas: 
ACTION-INITIATOR
If an operation is chosen for execution and it has an accompanying subsidiary plan, adopt interest in whether it is successfully executed and insert the initial nodes into called-nodes.
Send the operation of the node to the along with the subsidiary plan for its execution if there is one, and adopt interest in whether it is successfully executed.
ACTION-INITIATOR.
permanent-ultimate-epistemic-interests: (U2*) Find an x such that x is an adoptable plan.
When the belief that x is an adoptable plan is acquired:
insert -Find a y such that y is a plan for achieving the same goals as x and y is rationally preferable to x› into ultimate-epistemic-interests;
for each initial node z of x: insert -x is executable› in ultimate-epistemic-interests.
(U4) Find a v such that v is an executable operation. When the belief that v is an executable operation is acquired, send v to the ACTION-INITIATOR.
(The ACTION-INITIATOR will insert -v has been executed› into ultimate-epistemic-interests when it tries to execute v.)
forwards directed prima facie reasons:
(E11) -x is the tail of y with respect to z and z was an executable node and z has been executed› is a prima facie reason for -x is an adoptable plan›.
forwards directed conclusive reasons:
(E12) -y is the subsidiary plan for z, and z is an executable node, and y has been fully executed› is a conclusive reason for -node z has been executed›. (E13) -Node z was executable, v is the operation prescribed by node z, and v was executed during the time z was executable› is a conclusive reason for -z was executed›. (E14) -x is an adoptable plan and z is an initial node of x› is a conclusive reason for -z is called›.
(E15) -x was an executable node of plan y and x has been executed› is a conclusive reason for -x is no longer executable›.
backwards directed conclusive reasons:
(E16) -z is called, its preconditions are satisfied, and its timing-condition is satisfied› is a conclusive reason for -z is an executable plan-node›. (E17) -v is the operation prescribed by an executable plan-node z of expected-value δ› is a conclusive reason for -v is an executable operation of strength δ›. (E18) -x is not prescribed by any executable plan-node of expected-value δ› is a conclusive reason for -x is not an executable operation of strength δ›.
These combine to give us the reasoning diagramed in figure 8 . This constitutes a doxastic implementation of the plan execution architecture diagramed in figure 7. To verify this, let us step through the operation of a reasoner supplied with these permanent-ultimate-epistemic-interests and reason schemas. We begin with beliefs of the form -x is adoptable›, supplied by the planning architecture described above. The pursuit of such beliefs was already among the permanent-ultimate-epistemic-interests, but (U2*) adds an instruction to the effect that whenever such a belief is acquired, queries about whether the initial nodes of x are executable should be inserted into ultimate-epistemic-interests. These queries are answered in terms of (E15) and (E16). If the reasoner concludes that an initial node z is executable, and it also concludes that z prescribes an operation v, then it concludes, by (E17), that v is an executable operation, and by (U4), it sends v to the ACTION-INITIATOR and that initiates interest in whether v has been executed. Information to the effect that varous operations have been executed is used to conclude that nodes prescribing them have been executed (by (E12)) and that plans have been fully executed. When it is concluded that an initial node z has been executed, it is inferred by (E11) that the tail of x with respect to z is an adoptable plan, and the loop begins again. Thus we have a doxastic implementation of the Figure 8 . A doxastic implementation of the plan execution architecture.
PLANNER
The ACTION-INITIATOR
The PLAN-EXECUTOR places operations awaiting execution in a list of executable-operations. The task of the ACTION-INITIATOR is to decide which of these operations to execute at any given time. When it decides to execute one of these operations, it monitors the attempted execution and when it is ascertained that the operation has been successfully executed, that operation is deleted from the list of executable-operations.
The fundamental question about the ACTION-INITIATOR is: how does it decide what to do when? The main difficulty in answering this question arises from the fact that the planning architecture adumbrated above leaves an important gap between planning and acting. This is due, in part, to the fact that rationality dictates leaving schedules as flexible as possible to accommodate new plans as they are adopted and to enable the agent to make use of new information that may lower execution costs if plan execution is scheduled in light of it. Return to the example of painting my garage. As the time for buying the paint approaches, I schedule the purchase more and more precisely. First, I planned (yesterday) to buy the paint today. Then I planned to buy it this afternoon. Then I planned to buy it on my way to the grocery store. In this way I generate more and more precise schedules. But I may never generate an absolutely precise schedule. When I actually get into the paint store and stand at the counter, there has to be something that makes me decide to buy the paint now (rather than 30 seconds from now, or 5 minutes from now). At any given time, it will typically be the case that nodes from many different plans have been called, their timing-conditions are satisfied, and they are waiting to be executed by having their operations executed. For instance, I plan to call my travel agent sometime this afternoon to check on my car rental in New Zealand, I plan to start the barbecue pretty soon to fix dinner, I plan to run out to the mailbox and retrieve my mail before it gets dark, and so forth. All three of these plans have nodes that have been called and are awaiting execution. The timing-conditions are sufficiently broad that I can successfully execute the nodes any time during the next several hours. I might engage in further planning and refine my schedule for when to do them, but more likely a time will come when I just decide to do one of them, and then later I will decide to do another, and so on. These decisions are the work of the ACTION-INITIATOR rather than the PLANNER. To complete the theory of rational plan execution, we need an account of how the ACTION-INITIATOR decides what to do at any given time.
The basis for such a mechanism lies in a distinction between two kinds of primitive desiresdesires for the future and desires for the present. Only the former can be the subject of planning. You cannot plan for the present. Planning takes time and you cannot plan ahead for a situation that is already here. In order to play any role in directing action, desires for the present must be desires to do something. I will refer to such desires as "present-tense action desires".
What we might call "a reactive agent" (as opposed to a rational agent) guides its actions solely on the basis of built-in and conditioned reflexes generating immediate action. Even in a reactive agents, there can be conflicts that must be adjudicated. More than one reflex can be triggered at the same time, and it may be impossible to perform the actions dictated by them all. A reactive agent must have some mechanism for adjudicating disputes in such cases. The only obvious mechanism is to assign strengths to reflexes, and when two reflexes compete, the stronger wins. We can, at least metaphorically, think of such reflexes as generating present-tense action desires, and in deciding what to do when there is a conflict, all the reactive agent can do is act on the desire that is strongest, i.e., do what it most wants to do.
An agent capable of planning can do better. It can, in many cases, adjust its plans so as to avoid such conflicts. However, planning can never entirely replace reacting to present-tense action desires. Planning is only applicable insofar as we can predict what is apt to befall us. If the unexpected happens, it may be too late to plan for it and all we can do is react. Basic reflexes like withdrawing from pain are going to be essential ingredients in any rational agent. Ratiocination can only supplement such pre-rational mechanisms.
Just as a reactive agent can experience conflicting reflexes, a rational agent can encounter conflicts between plans and reflexes. The plan to retrieve a valuable object that fell into a fire may conflict with the reflex of withdrawing one's hand from the fire. Sometimes, the plan wins out. This requires that there be an adjudication mechanism in a rational agent that can choose not only between actions prescribed by present-tense action desires, but also actions prescribed by plans. This must be done in terms of the value of some parameter of the actions between which the agent is choosing. In the case of actions prescribed by present-tense action desires, the relevant parameter is how much the agent wants to perform the action, i.e., the strength of the desire. Accordingly, we can use the same language in talking about the parameter attaching to actions prescribed by plans. The agent wants, more or less strongly, to perform such an action, and it can decide which action to perform by selecting the one it wants most strongly to perform. How badly an agent wants to perform such an action can be regarded as the strength of the agent's desire to perform it, where this desire is the instrumental desire produced by adopting the plan. Plan nodes correspond to instrumental desires, and instrumental desires have strengths associated with them. This strength is inherited by the mandated operation when it is passed to the ACTION-INITIATOR. The executable operations are things the agent "wants to do", and the strength is a measure of how badly the agent wants to do it. The ACTION-INITIATOR selects the one the agent wants most to do (if there is a tie it randomly selects one of the most preferred operations) and then initiates the execution of that operation, deleting it from the list of executableoperations. At the same time it queries epistemic cognition about whether the operation is executed successfully. If the belief is adopted that the operation was not executed successfully then it is reinserted into the list of executable-operations so that the agent can try again.
The ACTION-INITIATOR has the hard-wired ability to initiate basic acts (basic motor skills). If an executable operation is a basic act, and it is not accompanied by an execution plan, then when it is selected for execution, the built-in routines are executed automatically. The built-in routines can be overridden by accompanying the act with an execution plan. For instance, I can normally raise my arm automatically by executing built-in routines for that purpose. But if my arm is anesthetized, I may instead raise it by lifting it with my other arm. Operations that are not basic acts must be accompanied by execution plans. Whenever an operation is accompanied by an execution plan and the operation is selected for execution, that subsidiary execution plan is judged adoptable and its initial nodes are judged to be called. The execution of the subsidiary plan is then carried out by the PLAN-EXECUTOR. This simple model of action initiation explains a great deal. There is a temptation in the theory of practical reasoning to think of the adoption of a plan as beginning a process that grinds inexorably to the execution of the plan unless it is subsequently retracted (i.e., unless the agent changes its mind). But that is inaccurate. Adopting a plan is not like setting a train moving on rigid rails. Even though I plan to do something and never explicitly change my mind, the plan may never be executed just because I never feel like executing it. There may always be other things I want to do more. This can include doing nothing. For example, I might adopt the plan to go to the grocery store this afternoon. As the afternoon progresses, it occurs to me at various times that I planned to go to the grocery store, but each time my reaction is, "Oh, I don't feel like going just now. I will do it later." Finally, the afternoon is over and I have not gone, but there was never a point at which I explicitly retracted my plan to go. I just didn't do it.
It is not only lethargy that can keep plans from being executed. I may have planned to go to the grocery store, but I got engrossed in writing this paper, and every time I thought about going to the grocery store I decided that I would rather keep writing and go later. Eventually, the afternoon was over and I had not gone.
Notice that lethargy and wanting to continue writing are present-tense action desires rather than operations prescribed by plans. That is, they are primitive desires produced by optative dispositions and concern our present behavior rather than our future behavior. Presumably, lethargy is the result of a built-in optative disposition, whereas wanting to continue writing is almost certainly the result of an acquired optative disposition. These examples illustrate the importance of the mechanisms of the reactive agent even in a sophisticated planning agent. Such mechanisms play an extremely important role in "modulating" the behavior of the planning agent.
Conclusions
The main conclusion to be drawn from all this is that complex patterns of practical reasoning can be implemented in a suitably constructed rational agent by reducing them to defeasible epistemic reasoning via doxastification. Accordingly, the OSCAR architecture is built around a general purpose defeasible epistemic reasoner. At this time, that architecture has been fully implemented. The architecture is programmable by supplying it with different arrays of conclusive and prima facie reason schemas and defeaters. Work is currently underway to implement planning and plan execution by incorporating the reason schemas described above.
